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Abstract.
 
The present paper evaluates the current account patterns of 69 countries during 1981–2006.
We identify an asymmetric effect of  the USA as the ‘demander of  last resort’: a 1% increase in
the lagged US imports/GDP is associated with a 0.3% increase in current account surpluses of
countries running surpluses, but results in insignificant changes in the current accounts of countries
running deficits. The impact of US demand variables is larger on the current accounts of developing
countries than that of  OECD countries. We also contemplate China’s current account over the
next 6 years, and project a large drop in its current account/GDP surpluses.
 
1.
 
introduction
 
The published literature dealing with global imbalances focuses attention on
the enigma of the ‘poor’ financing the ‘rich’, as exemplified by the patterns of
China and the USA’s current account balances during the 1990s and the early
2000s.
 
1
 
 The onset of the subprime crisis, its deflationary impact on the USA
and the resultant recessionary pressure facing other countries indicate that the
previous patterns are unsustainable.
 
2
 
 We evaluate this conjecture using panel
regressions that account for the USA’s role as ‘demander of  last resort’,
controlling for other variables suggested in the literature. As China is expected
to be a key player in the adjustment of global imbalances, we also assess the
degree to which China’s current account patterns are explained by our panel
regressions, and project possible future Chinese current account paths.
The variables suggested in the literature include economic performance (e.g.
GDP/capita growth and levels), economic structure and openness (e.g. trade
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1
 
Further discussions on the sustainability of global imbalances can be found in Dooley
 
 et al.
 
(2004), Cooper (2005), Caballero
 
 et al.
 
 (2006), Roubini (2006), Setser (2006), Edwards (2004, 2005,
2007), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), Ju and Wei (2007a), Chinn and Ito (2007) and Aizenman and
Sun (2008).
 
2
 
See the IMF’s 
 
World Economic Outlook
 
 (October 2008) for a discussion of the challenges facing
the global economy and recent current account patterns. Aizenman and Jinjarak (forthcoming)
provide some international evidence on the impact of the current account deficit on the appreciation
of real estate markets.
 usa as the 
 
‘
 
demander of last resort
 
’
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openness and composition of exports, financial openness and external wealth),
demographic variables (e.g. age dependence), exchange rate regimes and liquidity,
sudden stops history, among others (see IMF (2008) for further discussion and
detailed references). As the USA has played a pivotal role as the ‘demander
of last resort’ during recent decades, it makes sense to add lagged the US
current account deficit to the list of  variables explaining current account
patterns of other countries.
 
3
 
 We identify a large but asymmetric effect of the
US role as the demander of last resort: a 1% increase in the lagged US imports/
GDP is associated with a 0.3% increase in the current account surpluses of
countries running surpluses, but results in insignificant changes to the current
accounts of countries running deficits.
 
4
 
 We control for all these variables in
panel regressions of 69 countries during 1981–2006. Overall, not more than
80% of the variation is accounted for by regressions that include fixed effects,
and China’s fixed-effect coefficient is insignificant. Ranked according to
economic impact on China’s current account (% of GDP), the most important
variable is the lagged US current account deficit, followed by China’s GDP
growth, trade openness, bank credits/GDP, age dependency, net foreign assets/
GDP, financial openness and commodity exports/GDP.
We apply the regression analysis to project the future patterns of China’s
current account under two extreme scenarios. The first case is where all the
conditioning variables would be impacted by one standard deviation shocks
during the next 6 years in ways that would 
 
increase
 
 China’s current account
surplus: as would occur if  global and domestic booms were to take place. The
second scenario is the opposite, where all the conditioning variables would be
impacted by one standard deviation shocks in ways that would 
 
decrease
 
 China’s
current account surplus: as would be the case if  a global and domestic recession
were to take place. These two scenarios provide us with a band of plausible
future paths. We compare the resultant band with the latest 
 
World Economic
Outlook
 
 (IMF 2008) forecast of China’s future current account, and determine
that the 
 
World Economic Outlook
 
 projections may be overly optimistic, fore-
casting the continuation of high current account surpluses. We conclude with
a discussion of these results.
2.
 
data and estimation
 
Our data on current account balances and macroeconomic factors cover years
1981–2006. Most of the data (details documented in Appendix I) are taken
from the World Development Indicators(www.worldbank.org), the Inter-
national Investment Positions (www.imf.org), the External Wealth of Nations
(http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/pages/people/planedata.php) and the 
 
World Economic
 
3
 
Aizenman and Sun (2008) report that during recent years the US current account deficit ascended
to well above half of the global current account deficits.
 
4
 
Similar results apply to current accounts: a 1% increase in the lagged US current account deficit
is associated with 0.5% increase in current account surpluses of countries running surpluses, but
with insignificant changes in current account deficits of countries running deficits.
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Outlook
 
 (IMF 2008), supplemented with Chinn and Ito’s (2006) capital
account openness index, Shambaugh’s (2004) pegged exchange rate indicators,
and our own calculated deviation from purchasing power parity implied by
the penn effects (see Aizenman 2008) and sudden-stop indicators.
 
5
 
 In addition,
we restrict the sample to countries with at least ten annual observations to
allow for panel estimation and subsequent division of the whole sample into
sub-periods and country groups. Although we try to include as many countries
possible, some variables such as the net foreign asset are available for a limited
number of  countries. While this set of  variables is a variant of  those used
by Chinn and Prasad (2003), Gruber and Kamin (2007), and the IMF (2008),
the variables represent the same macroeconomic factors in their studies and
are selected to maximize our country coverage. After pooling all the relevant
variables, we have 69 countries (of  which 21 are OECD, as tabulated in
Appendix II).
Following the literature, we estimate
(1)
where 
 
CAB
 
it
 
 is the current account balances (as % GDP) of  country 
 
i
 
 at
time 
 
t
 
, and 
 
X
 
it
 
–1
 
 is a vector of lagged macroeconomic factors, 
 
C
 
i
 
 
 

 
 {
 
c
 
1
 
, . . . ,
 
c
 
63
 
} is a vector of country fixed effects, and 
 
DEMAND
 
USA
 
,
 
t
 
–1
 
 is the lagged US
demand (as % of GDP). This empirical specification links the current account
to the variables suggested by saving-investment framework, augmented with
institutional and policy variables. The innovation is the inclusion of  the US
demand variable (measured by current account deficit, final consumption,
household consumption, and imports (as % GDP)) since the USA acted
frequently as the demander of the ‘last resort.’ Another frequently cited notion
is that due to the growing size of China, the size of the US current account
deficit might impact China’s ability to run surpluses (see also Aizenman and
Sun 2008).
 
6
 
 Although the lagged US current account/GDP is more endogenous
than the other measures of lagged US demand, we will run a battery of regressions
using each of the four measures (as the motivation is to identify the US role
as ‘demander of last resort’), with particular attention to consumption/GDP
and import/GDP ratios.
Some preliminary statistics are in order. By comparing the contemporaneous
correlations between current account balances (as % of GDP) and the macro-
economic variables of China and other developing countries, we can see several
structural differences (i.e. foreign exchange reserves, per capita GDP, age
dependency, domestic credit by banking sector, capital account openness and
 
5
 
For literature supporting the effects of these macroeconomic factors on the current accounts, see
Cavallo and Frankel (forthcoming) for sudden-stop indicators; Helliwell (2004), Higgins (1998),
De-Santis and Lührmann (2006) and Taylor (2002) for the effect of aging on current accounts;
Chamon and Prasad (2007) for the impact of age dependency and saving of households in China;
and Chinn and Prasad (2003), Chinn and Ito (2007), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Gruber
and Kamin (2007) for standard determinants of the current accounts.
 
6
 
Note that if  one takes the saving-glut argument literally, then the causality would be reversed.
See Chinn and Ito (2007) for more discussion.
CAB X C DEMAND C c cit it i USA t it i        ;   { , . . . , },= ′ + + + ≡− −1 1 1 69β φ ε
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trade openness). These differences suggest that the Chinese experience could
be unique, possibly because of China’s size, its rapid takeoff, and other unique
characteristics. We will try to account for these structural differences using
various estimation techniques and alternative specifications. To make sure all the
variables in our estimation are of the same order of integration, we apply several
unit root and cointegration tests. The panel cointegration test of Westerlund
(2007) under the null hypothesis of no cointegration between current account/
GDP and other variables can be rejected by at least one of the test statistics
at the 1% level.
 
7
 
 For the Chinese series, the Kwiatkowski 
 
et al
 
. (1992) test
suggests that the null of trend stationary cannot be rejected at appropriate lags
for all the variables.
 
8
 
 We also apply to the Chinese series a cointegration test
between the current account and other variables (following Johansen and
Juselius 1990) and test the null hypothesis that there is no cointegrating relation-
ship between the current account and each of the variables. The likelihood-
ratio test suggests that the null of no cointegration with the current account
can be rejected for the explanatory variables in our estimated model.
 
9
 
2.1.
 
Baseline results and alternative specifications
 
We provide the regression estimates using both the annual and 5-year average
panel data. Tables 1 and 2 present our baseline results with annual data. We
include a lagged current account because studies using annual data tend to
find evidence of  serial correlation in the panel. Our estimation performs
reasonably well and explains approximately 80% of  the current account
variation from 1981 to 2006.
 
10
 
 The explanatory variables are robust across
the specifications can be categorized by their effects on the current account
surpluses as follows:
• Positively: lagged current account, net foreign assets to GDP,
 
11
 
 domestic
credit to GDP, trade openness, sudden stops of  capital inflows, the US
 
7
 
The rejection is weak for GDP per capita, GDP growth and population growth.
 
8
 
In contrast to the Kwiatkowski 
 
et al
 
. (1992) test, the Dickey–Fuller test cannot reject the null
hypothesis that China and the US current accounts/GDP contain a unit root over the sample
period; both series are I(1). The residual series from fitting the Chinese series on the US series are
not stationary. This may reflect the low power of the test, suggesting that the relationship between the
USA and China’s current account balances to GDP cannot be explained by a simple cointegration,
in isolation of other conditioning macroeconomic factors. It is also consistent with the conjecture
that the current account/GDP ratio follows a unit-root process if  its value stays within a certain
range, but reverts to its long-run equilibrium when the current account/GDP ratio exceeds some
threshold values (see Ju & Wei 2007b).
 
9
 
Using the Engle–Granger test, the null can be rejected for foreign exchange reserves, GDP per
capita, age dependency ratio, trade openness and US imports.
 
10
 
We note that the inclusion of a lagged current account exposes our estimation to the dynamic
panel problem. However, according to Judson and Owen (1999), with 
 
N
 
 
 
=
 
 69 and 
 
T
 
 
 
=
 
 [10, 26] any
difference between the performance (RMSE) of our estimation and other estimators tends to be
small (see their table 2).
 
11
 
The net foreign asset position at time 
 
t
 
 is the initial position plus the cumulative current account
and cumulative net capital gains on cross-border positions.
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Table 1. Annual data estimation of current account balances to GDP and macroeconomic factors: All countries
 
Current account balance (% of  GDP)
OLS with annual data and country fixed effects
1 2 3 4 5
Estimate 
(standard error)
Estimate 
(standard error)
Estimate 
(standard error)
Estimate 
(standard error)
Estimate 
(standard error)
Lagged dependent variable 0.666 (0.020)*** 0.673 (0.020)*** 0.668 (0.020)*** 0.668 (0.020)*** 0.674 (0.020)***
Net foreign asset (% of  GDP) 0.010 (0.002)*** 0.010 (0.002)*** 0.010 (0.002)*** 0.011 (0.002)*** 0.010 (0.002)***
Foreign exchange reserves (% of GDP)
 
−
 
0.048 (0.016)***
 
−
 
0.044 (0.016)***
 
−
 
0.050 (0.017)***
 
−
 
0.055 (0.017)***
 
−
 
0.044 (0.016)***
GDP per capita, PPP (thousand)
 
−
 
0.046 (0.023)**
 
−
 
0.030 (0.022)
 
−
 
0.050 (0.024)**
 
−
 
0.078 (0.028)***
 
−
 
0.030 (0.022)
Growth of GDP, PPP (annual %)
 
−
 
0.083 (0.019)***
 
−
 
0.082 (0.019)***
 
−
 
0.080 (0.019)***
 
−
 
0.079 (0.019)***
 
−
 
0.082 (0.019)***
Age dependency ratio
 
−
 
0.059 (0.016)***
 
−
 
0.069 (0.016)***
 
−
 
0.057 (0.017)***
 
−
 
0.042 (0.018)**
 
−
 
0.069 (0.016)***
Population growth (annual %) 0.135 (0.085) 0.123 (0.085) 0.132 (0.085) 0.145 (0.085)* 0.123 (0.085)
Ores and metals exports (% of exports)
 
−
 
0.026 (0.022)
 
−
 
0.023 (0.023)
 
−
 
0.024 (0.022)
 
−
 
0.022 (0.022)
 
−
 
0.023 (0.023)
Fuel exports (% of exports)
 
−
 
0.014 (0.009)
 
−
 
0.013 (0.009)
 
−
 
0.014 (0.009)
 
−
 
0.013 (0.009)
 
−
 
0.013 (0.009)
Domestic credit by banking sector (% of  GDP) 0.006 (0.003)* 0.007 (0.003)** 0.007 (0.003)* 0.007 (0.003)** 0.007 (0.003)**
Capital account openness index 0.005 (0.080) 0.033 (0.081) 0.010 (0.080)
 
−
 
0.049 (0.084) 0.030 (0.080)
Pegged exchange rate indicator
 
−
 
0.076 (0.210)
 
−
 
0.069 (0.211)
 
−
 
0.062 (0.210)
 
−
 
0.040 (0.210)
 
−
 
0.068 (0.211)
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 0.021 (0.007)*** 0.022 (0.008)*** 0.021 (0.007)*** 0.018 (0.008)** 0.022 (0.007)***
Average days to clear exports through customs 0.045 (0.095) 0.044 (0.095) 0.039 (0.095) 0.020 (0.095) 0.042 (0.095)
Average times firms spent with tax officials 0.163 (0.273) 0.274 (0.271) 0.152 (0.276)
 
−
 
0.006 (0.287) 0.271 (0.271)
Sudden stop at year 
 
t
 
; CA-L.CA 
 
> 0.03GDP 5.791 (0.224)*** 5.812 (0.225)*** 5.797 (0.224)*** 5.778 (0.224)*** 5.811 (0.224)***
Sudden stop within the previous 5 years 0.196 (0.177) 0.220 (0.177) 0.222 (0.177) 0.206 (0.176) 0.218 (0.177)
US current account deficit (% of GDP) 0.145 (0.055)***
US final consumption (% of  GDP) 0.015 (0.050)
US household consumption (% of  GDP) 0.152 (0.071)**
US imports (% of  GDP) 0.142 (0.049)***
Adjusted R2 0.8002 0.7992 0.7999 0.8004 0.7994
Observations 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430
CABit is the current account balance (as % GDP) of country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors, as outlined in the Appendix I, Ci is a vector of country
fixed effects, and DEMANDUSA,t–1 is the lagged US demand (as % of GDP). The constant term and country indicators are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***, ** and * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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current account deficit, US final consumption, US household consumption
and US imports
• Negatively: foreign exchange reserves, growth of GDP and age dependency
ratio.
Table 2 shows that the impacts of these macroeconomic factors differ between
countries running current account deficits (specification 4) and countries
running surpluses (specification 8). Essentially, the influence of US imports is
significant only for the countries running surpluses. To confirm these findings,
we also run the estimation with a non-overlapping panel of 5-year data. The
US imports/GDP is found to be positive and statistically significant, particularly
for the countries running surpluses.12 We will subsequently use specification
4 in Table 1 (and specifications 4 and 8 in Table 2) with US imports/GDP as
the preferred specification. First, these specifications offer higher explanatory
power than the other specifications. Second, because we include the lagged
US current account, the coefficient estimates will be consistent if  the lagged
US current account is orthogonal to the lagged own-country current account,
which seems unlikely. It would be appropriate to use US consumption or US
imports, which may be less endogenous than the US current account deficit.
Based on the performance of our estimation, we will use the US imports/GDP
as the key measure of US demand in the following sections.
Overall, the main findings are robust across country groups and sample
periods. We also find that the frequently cited negative impact of age dependency
is significant for the subsample of  developing countries in the 1995–2006
period, suggesting that the current account adjustment related to demographic
change applies beyond the OECD population. Interestingly, the impact of US
demand variables is larger on the current account of developing countries than
the current account of OECD countries, supporting the enigma of the poor
economies financing the rich ones.13 Comparing developing countries in surplus
and those in deficit (see Table 3), we find that the developing countries in surplus
are more affected by the size of the US current account deficit/GDP than
those in deficit (the coefficient estimate is equal to 0.478, compared to 0.151
for the developing countries in deficit). Using a random-effects model as
another possible specification, we find that the coefficient estimate on the US
imports/GDP variable continues to be positive and significant for the surplus
countries.14 We also verify the robustness of the main results to interacting
Chinn–Ito’s capital account openness with the lagged US import and the
lagged US current account variables.15 The main results are robust to this
modification: the direct effect of lagged US imports (or lagged US current
account) unchanged as a result of the interaction. For the lagged imports/GDP,
the interaction term negatively affects the current account/GDP deficit
12 We test the residuals (as suggested in Wooldridge (2002) and find no serial correlation.
13 See, for example, Alfaro et al. (2008).
14 Results are available upon request. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random
effects suggests that the random effects are not needed.
15 We thank Jeff Frankel for suggesting this robustness analysis.
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Table 2. Annual data estimation of current account balances to GDP and macroeconomic factors – surplus versus deficit countries
Current account balance (% of  GDP)
OLS with annual data and country fixed effects
Countries running current account deficit Countries running current account surpluses
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Estimate 
(standard 
error)
Estimate 
(standard 
error)
Estimate 
(standard 
error)
Estimate 
(standard 
error)
Lagged dependent variable 0.647 0.652 0.650 0.648 0.675 0.683 0.672 0.672 
(0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.051)*** (0.052)*** (0.051)*** (0.051)***
Net foreign asset (% of  GDP) 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 −0.009 −0.008 −0.011 −0.007 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Foreign exchange reserves (% of GDP) −0.040 −0.040 −0.040 −0.044 −0.068 −0.066 −0.075 −0.078
(0.023)* (0.023)* (0.023)* (0.023)* (0.030)** (0.030)** (0.030)** (0.030)**
GDP per capita, PPP (thousand) −0.123 −0.114 −0.117 −0.131 0.021 0.047 −0.001 −0.066
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.032)*** (0.036)*** (0.042) (0.040) (0.044) (0.057)
Growth of GDP, PPP (annual %) −0.111 −0.113 −0.112 −0.111 −0.050 −0.045 −0.046 −0.044
(0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)*** (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Age dependency ratio −0.045 −0.052 −0.051 −0.042 −0.132 −0.149 −0.117 −0.081
(0.021)** (0.020)** (0.021)** (0.023)* (0.035)*** (0.034)*** (0.036)*** (0.042)*
Population growth (annual %) 0.238 0.229 0.230 0.239 −0.033 −0.038 −0.014 −0.010
(0.113)** (0.114)** (0.114)** (0.114)** (0.135) (0.135) (0.134) (0.134)
Ores and metals exports (% of exports) −0.028 −0.028 −0.028 −0.027 −0.092 −0.078 −0.091 −0.095
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Fuel exports (% of exports) −0.008 −0.006 −0.007 −0.007 −0.048 −0.046 −0.044 −0.045
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)** (0.017)***
Domestic credit by banking sector (% of  GDP) 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 −0.001 0.000 −0.002 −0.003
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Capital account openness index 0.079 0.099 0.097 0.067 −0.110 −0.056 −0.104 −0.217
(0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.104) (0.191) (0.191) (0.189) (0.196)
Pegged exchange rate indicator −0.186 −0.177 −0.178 −0.165 0.159 0.186 0.177 0.146
(0.261) (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.460) (0.461) (0.457) (0.456)
u
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Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.021 −0.006 −0.002 −0.005 −0.014
(0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Average days to clear exports through customs −0.028 −0.006 −0.010 −0.037 0.059 0.088 0.051 −0.050
(0.072) (0.071) (0.073) (0.079) (0.184) (0.186) (0.183) (0.188)
Average times firms spent with tax officials 0.093 0.117 0.110 0.055 −0.143 −0.190 −0.093 −0.077
(0.279) (0.280) (0.281) (0.288) (0.146) (0.144) (0.148) (0.148)
Sudden stop at year t; CA-L.CA > 0.03 GDP 5.325 5.319 5.323 5.310 6.531 6.614 6.470 6.493
(0.265)*** (0.266)*** (0.265)*** (0.266)*** (0.489)*** (0.489)*** (0.488)*** (0.484)***
sudden stop within the previous 5 years 0.137 0.152 0.153 0.148 0.037 0.071 0.112 −0.011
(0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.407) (0.412) (0.407) (0.405)
US current account deficit (% of GDP) 0.094 0.194
(0.066) (0.121)
US final consumption (% of  GDP) −0.009 0.049
(0.060) (0.106)
US household consumption (% of  GDP) 0.022 0.351
(0.087) (0.150)**
US imports (% of  GDP) 0.052 0.313
(0.058) (0.116)***
Adjusted R2 0.7348 0.7342 0.7342 0.7344 0.6988 0.6968 0.7013 0.7028
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007 423 423 423 423
CABit is the current account balances (as % GDP) of country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors, as outlined in Appendix I, Ci is a vector of country
fixed effects, and DEMANDUSA,t–1 is the lagged US demand (as % of GDP). The constant term and country indicators are not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***, ** and * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. CA-L.CA, first-difference in the size of current account.
Current account balance (% of  GDP)
OLS with annual data and country fixed effects
Countries running current account deficit Countries running current account surpluses
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Table 2. Continued
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Table 3. Deficit versus surplus developing countries
Current account balance (% of  GDP)
Response to US current account deficit (% GDP) Response to US imports (% of  GDP)
Deficit developing 
countries
Surplus developing 
countries
Deficit developing 
countries
Deficit developing 
countries
1 2 3 4
Estimate 
(standard error)
Estimate 
(standard error)
Estimate 
(standard error)
Estimate 
(standard error)
Lagged dependent variable 0.762 (0.033)*** 0.649 (0.073)*** 0.764 (0.033)*** 0.681 (0.072)***
Net foreign asset (% of  GDP) 0.015 (0.002)*** −0.001 (0.009) 0.015 (0.002)*** 0.005 (0.009)
Foreign exchange reserves (% of GDP) −0.070 (0.022)*** −0.051 (0.037) −0.074 (0.023)*** −0.095 (0.039)**
GDP per capita, PPP (thousand) −0.042 (0.054) 0.085 (0.126) −0.046 (0.055) 0.033 (0.124)
Growth of GDP, PPP (annual %) −0.080 (0.026)*** −0.005 (0.048) −0.079 (0.027)*** 0.010 (0.046)
Age dependency ratio −0.033 (0.011)*** −0.049 (0.025)** −0.032 (0.011)*** −0.028 (0.025)
Population growth (annual %) 0.279 (0.117)** 0.133 (0.172) 0.280 (0.117)** 0.139 (0.168)
Ores and metals exports (% of exports) −0.004 (0.008) −0.022 (0.028) −0.003 (0.008) −0.016 (0.027)
Fuel exports (% of exports) −0.002 (0.006) 0.010 (0.012) −0.000 (0.007) 0.011 (0.011)
Domestic credit by banking sector (% of  GDP) 0.008 (0.003)** 0.010 (0.007) 0.009 (0.003)*** 0.013 (0.007)*
Capital account openness index 0.129 (0.083) −0.357 (0.170)** 0.113 (0.085) −0.337 (0.166)**
Pegged exchange rate indicator 0.073 (0.250) 0.153 (0.550) 0.069 (0.250) 0.262 (0.539)
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) 0.003 (0.007) −0.005 (0.012) 0.003 (0.007) −0.006 (0.011)
Average days to clear exports through customs 0.045 (0.039) −0.071 (0.086) 0.042 (0.039) −0.113 (0.085)
Average times firms spent with tax officials 0.003 (0.056) −0.029 (0.091) 0.001 (0.056) −0.058 (0.089)
Sudden stop at year t; CA-L.CA > 0.03GDP 5.937 (0.302)*** 8.072 (0.729)*** 5.938 (0.303)*** 8.098 (0.710)***
Sudden stop within the previous 5 years −0.272 (0.237) −0.453 (0.661) −0.250 (0.238) −0.190 (0.650)
US current account deficit (% GDP) 0.151 (0.078)* 0.478 (0.168)***
US imports (% of  GDP) 0.074 (0.046) 0.409 (0.097)***
R2 0.7291 0.6612 0.7287 0.6768
Observations 701 209 701 209
CABit is the current account balances (as % GDP) of country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors as outlined in the Appendix I, Ci is a vector of
country fixed effects, and DEMANDUSA,t–1 is the lagged US demand (as % of GDP). Constant term and country indicators are not reported. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, ** and * signify statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. PPP, purchasing power parity. CA-L.CA, first-difference in the size of
current account.
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developing countries, and positively affects the current account/GDP of surplus
OECD countries. Noting that the Chinn–Ito measure in our sample is bounded
between (–1.8, 2.5), these interactive effects are of a second order magnitude
relative to the direct effect.
2.2. China’s current account surpluses
We now focus on China. Figure 1 plots the predicted current account balances
for China based on our preferred specification 4 in Table 1. The actual values
are mostly larger than those predicted using our estimation, suggesting that
for one or several of the conditioning variables, a significant part of China’s
current account remains unexplained throughout most of the period. This also
implies a potential nonlinear effect, or that there is a unique, time persistent
Chinese effect, not captured by the conditioning variables. By examining the
country fixed effects from the baseline specification 4 in Table 1 for the annual
Figure 1. The predicted versus actual current account balances (% of GDP) of
China, with the USA as the ‘demander of last resort’: annual data. This figure plots
on the vertical axis the predicted values and on the horizontal axis the actual
values of the current account balances (% of GDP), based on specification 4 in
Table 1. The estimating equation is 
; where CABit is the current account balance (as % GDP) of
country i at time t, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic factors as outlined in the
Appendix I, Ci is a vector of country fixed effects, and IMPUSA,t–1 is lagged US
imports (as % of GDP). The correlation is 0.8885
CAB X C DEMANDit it i USA t it         ,= ′ + + +− −1 1β φ ε ;
C c ci   , . . . , ≡ 1 69{ }
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data, we find that the country fixed effects in both specifications for China are
statistically insignificant; during the 1981–2006 period, Japan, Switzerland and
Norway that registered significantly large country-fixed effects.16 To examine
the relative importance of the various conditioning variables in accounting for
the current account adjustment, Figure 2 presents the effects of a one standard
deviation (+1 SD) change in macroeconomic factors. Based on the coefficient
estimates from specification 4 in Table 1 for annual data in the top panel, the
effects are calculated by multiplying the regression coefficient by one SD of
the variable for each country group. For instance, the coefficient estimate (speci-
fication 4 in Table 1) of net foreign assets/GDP is 0.011; the one SD deviation
of NFA/GDP for developing countries excluding China is 63.929; the economic
significance of a +1 SD change of NFA/GDP on the current account surpluses
of developing countries excluding China is 0.011 × 63.929 = 0.703. For each of
the macroeconomic factors, we can see in Figure 2 that their economic impact
16 Figures are available upon request.
Figure 2. Economic significance of a one standard deviation (+1 SD) change
in current account surpluses (% of GDP). This figure presents the effects of +1
SD change in macroeconomic factors, based on the coefficient estimates from
specification 4 in Table 1 for the annual data. The +1 SD effects are calculated
by multiplying each of the coefficients by 1 SD of the variable for each country
group. For instance, the coefficient estimate of net foreign assets/GDP is 0.011;
the one SD of NFA/GDP for developing countries excluding China is 63.929;
the economic significant of +1 SD change inNFA/GDP on the current account
surpluses of developing countries excluding China is 0.011 × 63.929 = 0.703
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on the current accounts of China tend to be smaller than their impact on the
current accounts of other developing countries and the OECD (except that of
the foreign exchange reserves). The +1 SD increase of the US imports/GDP
has +0.47% impact on the ability to run the current account surpluses of China
as well as other country groups. Ranked by their economic significance (in
absolute terms) on China’s current account (% of GDP), the most important
variable is the US imports/GDP (+0.47%), followed by foreign reserves/GDP
(–0.56%), GDP growth (–0.24%), trade/GDP (+0.20%), bank credits/GDP
(+0.19%), age dependency (–0.19%), net foreign assets/GDP (+0.09%), capita
GDP (–0.08%) and population growth (+0.05%).
2.3. Possible adjustments
Figure 3 plots China’s current account balances during 1984–2006, together
with our projections of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios for the years 2007–2013,
supplemented by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 2008) forecast.
Based on the estimation results (specification 8) in Table 2 and the projections
of each macroeconomic factor xi from the Chinese data 1984–2006, the line
with marker ‘+’ plots the ‘good 1 SD scenario’, where each of the conditioning
variables gets a 1 SD shock that will increase the current account surplus (if
the impact of a variable xi on the current account balance is +, then the shock
to xi is +1 SD, if  the impact of xi on the current account balance is negative,
then the shock to xi is –1 SD). The second scenario is the opposite, the ‘bad
1 SD scenario’, where each of the conditioning variables gets a 1 SD shock
that will reduce the current account surplus. In essence, we set t = 2006; in the
‘good scenario’ we assume that during t + 1, t + 2, t + 3, . . . , t + 7, each year
1 SD ‘good shocks’ will materialize. Similarly, in the ‘bad 1 SD scenario’ we
assume that in each of the subsequent years, 1 SD ‘bad current account shocks’
will materialize. For the ‘bad 1 SD scenario’, we find that China’s current
account to GDP will be between 1 and 2% in surplus. In contrast, in the ‘good
1 SD scenario’, China’s current account surplus will fluctuate around 8–9%,
which is lower that the estimates in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October
2008). For both the good and bad scenarios, China’s current account surpluses
are expected to decline over the 2008–2013 periods.
What is the impact of halving the US deficit? The US deficit was $US731bn
in 2007 (approximately 5.3% of US GDP in 2007). Based on the preferred
specification 8 in Table 2 using 1981–2006 annual data, the coefficient estimate
of the US imports is 0.313, statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies
that halving the present US current account deficit/GDP via imports will trans-
late into a (2.65% × 0.313) = 0.83% reduction in China’s current account
surpluses/GDP, equivalent to $US27.2bn. Using our estimates, we can evaluate
the combined effect of a 1% US GDP import reduction on the balances of
all the countries running current account surpluses. We apply specification
8 in Table 2, and estimate the aggregate current account adjustment. The
level of  the ‘US import drop equivalent to 1% of  US GDP’ is $US138bn.
This adjustment would induce a drop in China’s current account surplus of
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$US10.3bn, developing countries excluding China of $US22.4bn, and OECD
countries of $US43.1bn, which sums up to a drop in total global surpluses of
approximately $US75.7bn.17
3. concluding remarks
Our analysis confirms the importance of the lagged US current account deficit in
explaining the current account patterns of other countries. Our projections of
the current account of China over the next 6 years include a range of current
17 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Curcuru et al. (2008) note that owing to mismeasurement of
net financial inflows, the US current account deficit could have been overestimated by as much as
0.6% per year. The mismeasurement in financial flows and merchandise trade could be even more
important to China. A more complete investigation into this issue is beyond the scope of our study.
Figure 3. Projection of china’s current account balances, 2007–2013. This figure plots
the actual and projected current account balances (% of GDP) for China for years
2007 to 2013. Results are based on the baseline results (specification 8) in Table 2
and the projection of each xi from the automatic lag selection using the actual
data from 1984 to 2006. The line with marker ‘+’ plots a best 1 standard deviation
(SD) scenario, where each of the conditioning variable gets a 1 SD shock that will
increase the current account surplus (if the impact of a variable xi on the current
account balance is +, then the shock to xi is +1 SD; if the impact of xi on the
current account balance is negative, then the shock to xi is –1 SD). The second
measure is the opposite, the ‘worst 1 SD scenario’, giving the configurations of
the xi with the 1 SD shocks that will minimize the current account balance
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account/GDP surpluses bounded between 12 and 14% at the high end, and
1–2% at the low end. In contrast, the latest World Economic Outlook is in the
range of  10–11%, well above our baseline projections of  6–9%. Although we
are unable to comment directly on the IMF approach that provided this
relatively high projection, the deflationary pressure triggered by the US
financial crisis suggests that the World Economic Outlook (October 2008)
forecast might be off  the mark, possibly because it ignores the global recession
impact of the present crisis, and the pivotal role of the USA as the ‘demander
of last resort.’
Indeed, one may argue that even in the absence of the recent financial crises,
the anomaly of large countries growing much faster than the global mean,
while running large and growing current account surpluses, leads to instability.
This may follow from the global adding-up property, where the sum of all
current accounts is zero (up to statistical discrepancies). This anomaly can
continue only as long as the deficit countries that grow, on average, at a much
lower rate than China, accommodate China by the needed increase in their
current account deficit/GDP. The USA played this role of ‘demander of last
resort’ during 1990–2005, accommodating Chinese surpluses. The recent financial
crisis may hasten the unwinding of the current account enigma, initiating reces-
sionary pressure that induces the unwinding of the US current account deficit.
This conjecture is in line with Aizenman and Sun (2008), who report that
during 1966–2005, excluding the USA, the length of current account deficit
spells is negatively related to the relative size of a country’s GDP. While one
may argue that the EU would replace the USA as a ‘demander of last resort’,
there are no signs pointing in that direction. The EU’s aggregate current
account (as % of GDP) was, on average, close to zero during 1990–2005, possibly
reflecting political economy factors that constrained the EU’s external borrowing.
Short of changing these factors, the case for the emergence of new ‘demanders
of last resort’, mitigating the drop in China’s current account surpluses, remains
dubious. Consequently, one expects that China’s future current account
surpluses may be constrained by the global adjustment, reducing them well
below the 10% benchmark. The large fiscal stimulus of China announced in
November 2008 is fully consistent with our reading that its projected lower
current account surpluses would require new demand sources.
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Appendix I. Data sources
Variable Database Database Code Sample Code
Current account balance (% of  GDP) WDI BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS cab_gdp
Net foreign asset (% of  GDP) EWN; IIP 79LADZF . . . ; 79AADZF . . . nfa_gdp
Foreign exchange reserves (% of GDP) EWN; IIP 79AKDZF . . . fxres_gdp
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $; thousand) WEO PPPPC _gdc_cons_ppp
Growth of GDP, PPP (constant 2005 international $) WEO PPPGDP _gdp_cons_ppp_gro
Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population) WDI SP.POP.DPND age_dep
Population growth (annual %) WEO LP pop_gro
Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) WDI TX.VAL.MMTL.ZS.UN ores_exp
Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) WDI TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN fuel_exp
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of  GDP) WDI FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS dcr_bank_gdp
Capital account openness index Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito kaopen kaopen
Pegged exchange rate indicator Jay Shambaugh jspeg jspeg
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) WDI TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS trade_gdp
Average time to clear exports through customs (days) WDI IC.CUS.DURS.EX _time_cus
Average number of  times firms spent in meetings with tax officials WDI IC.TAX.METG _time_tax
Sudden stop at year t; CA-L.CA > 0.03GDP Authors’ calculation NA ss0
Sudden stop within the previous 5 years Authors’ calculation NA ss5
US current account deficit (% of GDP) WDI BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS usa_cab_gdp_def
Deviation from PPP implied by penn effects Authors’ calculation NA penn
EWN, external wealth of  nations; IIP, international investment positions; NA, not applicable; PPP, purchasing power parity; WDI, world development indicators;
WEO, World Economic Outlook (IMF 2008). CA-L.CA, first-difference in the size of current account.
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Appendix II. Countries (69) and sample period for the estimation
OECD
Country 
code
Country 
name
Sample 
period OECD
Country 
code Country name
Sample 
period
ARG Argentina 1981 2006 KEN Kenya 1981 2004
* AUS Australia 1981 2006 * KOR Korea 1981 2006
* AUT Austria 1981 2006 LKA Sri Lanka 1981 2004
BEN Benin 1982 2002 MAR Morocco 1981 2006
BGD Bangladesh 1982 2004 MDG Madagascar 1981 2004
BGR Bulgaria 1996 2006 MEX Mexico 1981 2006
BOL Bolivia 1981 2006 MUS Mauritius 1990 2006
* CAN Canada 1981 2006 MWI Malawi 1981 2002
* CHE Switzerland 1996 2006 MYS Malaysia 1981 2006
CHL Chile 1981 2006 NER Niger 1981 2005
CHN China 1984 2006 NIC Nicaragua 1981 2005
CMR Cameroon 1982 2004 * NLD Netherlands 1981 2006
COL Colombia 1981 2006 * NOR Norway 1981 2003
CRI Costa Rica 1981 2006 * NZL New Zealand 1981 2006
* DEU Germany 1981 2006 OMN Oman 1981 2004
* DNK Denmark 1981 2006 PAK Pakistan 1981 2006
DOM Dominican 
Republic
1981 2001 PAN Panama 1981 2006
ECU Ecuador 1981 2006 PER Peru 1982 2006
EGY Egypt, 
Arab Republic
1981 2006 PHL Philippines 1981 2006
* ESP Spain 1981 2006 POL Poland 1990 2006
* FIN Finland 1981 2006 * PRT Portugal 1981 2006
* FRA France 1981 2006 PRY Paraguay 1991 2006
* GBR UK 1981 2006 SEN Senegal 1981 2004
GHA Ghana 1981 2004 SLV El Salvador 1981 2006
* GRC Greece 1981 2006 * SWE Sweden 1981 2005
GTM Guatemala 1981 2004 SYR Syrian 
Arab Republic
1981 2004
HND Honduras 1981 2004 THA Thailand 1981 2006
IDN Indonesia 1981 2006 TUR Turkey 1981 2006
IND India 1981 2005 TZA Tanzania 1997 2006
* IRL Ireland 1981 2006 UGA Uganda 1994 2006
* ISR Israel 1981 2006 URY Uruguay 1981 2006
* ITA Italy 1981 2006 * USA USA 1981 2006
JAM Jamaica 1981 2006 VEN Venezuela, RB 1981 2006
JOR Jordan 1981 2006 ZAF South Africa 1981 2006
* JPN Japan 1981 2006
